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EXPANDING PATIENT ACCESS TO BREAST CANCER GENETIC 
TESTING THROUGH INCENTIVE REGIMES 
ABSTRACT 
It is estimated that 268,600 women were diagnosed with breast cancer in 
2019 alone, and as many as 26,860 of these women could have developed breast 
cancer due to a genetic disposition.1 While over one million women have 
undergone genetic testing to identify variations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, 
the test results are often ambiguous due to identified variations for which the 
breast cancer development risk is unknown.2 A new technology known as 
CRISPR has the potential to change this state of uncertainty due to its capability 
to identify thousands of BRCA1 and 2 gene variations and accurately predict the 
associated breast cancer development risk.3 However, access to this innovative 
technology for the accurate classification of breast cancer predictors has been 
impeded by the emergence of proprietary rights over breast cancer predictors 
and the inconsistent regulation of genetic testing by the Food and Drug 
Administration. This article proposes a single regulatory pathway for all genetic 
tests that requires clinical validity for approval, allowing the use of technology 
such as CRISPR to supplement clinical patient data with accurate laboratory 
data. This proposal provides incentives for companies to enter the genetic 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A woman in the United States has a one in eight chance of developing breast 
cancer in her lifetime.4 Of the women who develop breast cancer, five to ten 
percent are more likely to have developed breast cancer due to a genetic 
disposition related to a variation in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.5 However, a 
significant number of identified BRCA gene variations have not been classified 
as breast cancer predictors due to the unknown breast cancer development risk 
associated with these variations.6 There is a new technology that has the 
capability to not only identify the complete range of BRCA gene variations but 
to also accurately classify these variations as breast cancer predictors.7 This 
emerging technology, called CRISPR, is a gene-editing technology.8 However, 
as this Article will demonstrate, there are two phenomena that are likely to 
hinder the application of CRISPR to breast cancer predictors, rendering the 
development and availability of this technology problematic. The first is the 
level of incentives in the form of proprietary rights, and the second is regulatory 
uncertainty. In order for women to benefit from this technology, companies need 
to enter the genetic testing market so that this technological advance can be used 
to make breast cancer predictors accessible. 
Proprietary rights through patent protection, the first phenomena, is the 
default incentive regime to innovation.9 Thus, innovation hinges on the 
patentability of genes and genetic tests. The problem is that the Supreme Court 
has held that genes and genetic tests are not eligible for patent protection, based 
on the finding that an isolated deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) segment is a 
naturally occurring product that is not made by man.10 Trade secrecy is also a 
factor in this area because it operates separately from patent protection.11 As an 
example, due to the exclusiveness of these two systems, the company that held 
the only BRCA gene patents developed a proprietary breast cancer predictor 
database and this trade secret was not impacted by the invalidation of the 
patents.12 This results in an even higher proprietary rights barrier for companies 
 
 4. Breast Cancer Risk in American Women, NAT’L CANCER INST., (last updated Oct. 3, 
2019). 
 5. Valoir, supra note 1. 
 6. Anny Huang, FDA Regulation of Genetic Testing: Institutional Reluctance and Public 
Guardianship, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 555, 566–67 (1998). 
 7. Zhang, supra note 3. 
 8. Id. 
 9. While there are alternative incentive regimes to innovation, this article focuses on patent 
protection because it is the primary mechanism of innovation in the United States. See Daniel J. 
Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L.R. 303, 311–12 
(2013) (explaining that incentive regimes include patents as well as prizes, government grants to 
offset research and development cost, and tax incentives). 
 10. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980). 
 11. Valoir, supra note 1 at 98. 
 12. Id. 
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looking to enter the genetic testing market, a consequence of the inability to 
exclude others via patent protection as well as the significant disadvantage 
companies have in classifying identified BRCA gene variations without the use 
of the largest repository of breast cancer predictor patient data.13 The ultimate 
consequence is the negative impact on women’s access to breast cancer 
predictors.14 
Regulation, the second phenomena, is the method by which the FDA 
oversees the safety and effectiveness of genetic tests.15 The FDA has the 
authority to regulate genetic tests as medical devices because the tests are used 
in the diagnosis and prevention of disease.16 There are stark differences in the 
validity required for FDA approval of genetic tests based on the method of test 
administration, either administration by the laboratory that created the test or by 
a laboratory following a purchase from the manufacturer.17 These regulation 
differences hinder the accessibility of breast cancer predictors because 
companies must contend with regulatory uncertainty, which can impede market 
entry.18 Even the introduction of direct-to-consumer genetic tests did not 
improve breast cancer predictor accessibility, as this third method of test 
administration only further complicated the regulation.19  
If one out of every eight women in the United States is at risk of developing 
breast cancer, there certainly is a significant number of women who would 
benefit from access to breast cancer predictors in order to identify treatment 
options before it is too late.20 While CRISPR has made more comprehensive and 
accurate genetic testing a reality, women cannot benefit from this technology if 
companies do not market genetic testing that utilizes the full range of breast 
cancer predictors.21 In order to overcome the impediments to breast cancer 
predictor accessibility, proprietary rights and regulation, a uniform regulatory 
pathway for genetic testing is needed that requires proof and disclosure of 
clinical validity to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the genetic tests. This 
Article argues that the FDA must establish a single regulatory pathway for 
genetic testing, balancing the requirement of clinical validity with the 
supplementation of patient data by technologies such as CRISPR in order to 
 
 13. Id. at 101. 
 14. Id. at 109. 
 15. FDA Fundamentals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., (last updated Feb. 9, 2018). 
 16. Suneel Arora et al., The Interplay between FDA and Patent Law: Infusing Organizational 
Knowledge for Medical Device Companies, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1176, 1177 (2013); Patricia 
J. Zettler et al., 23andMe, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Future of Genetic Testing, 
174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 493, 493 (Apr. 2014). 
 17. See Kayte Spector-Bagdady & Elizabeth R. Pike, Consuming Genomics: Regulating 
Direct-to-Consumer Genetic and Genomic Information, 92 NEB. L. REV. 677, 702–03 (2014). 
 18. See id. at 703. 
 19. See id. at 705. 
 20. NAT’L CANCER INST., supra note 5. 
 21. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 18, at 691. 
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overcome the inaccessibility of breast cancer predictors due to proprietary rights 
protection. 
Part II of this Article starts by outlining the reasons breast cancer predictors 
are not only relevant but also crucial for the medical treatment of women. This 
is followed by a discussion of how proprietary rights over breast cancer 
predictors emerged in the form of patent case law, leading to a substantial 
decrease in available patent protection for genetic tests, and a discussion of how 
the regulation of genetic tests is inconsistent. The discussion of both of these 
issues will illustrate how a lack of incentive for companies to enter the genetic 
testing market ultimately results in inaccessibility of breast cancer predictors. 
Part III of this Article analyzes how trade secrecy and the introduction of 
direct-to-consumer genetic tests have further impeded breast cancer predictor 
accessibility. This analysis starts with an assessment of how, even though patent 
protection over genetic tests has been substantially reduced, trade secrecy 
continues to disadvantage companies that lack years of patient data for 
establishing clinical validity. This is followed by an analysis of the complication 
of genetic testing regulation by the advent of direct-to-consumer tests, 
highlighting the negative impact of regulation variability on breast cancer 
predictor accessibility. 
Part IV proposes a novel solution that draws on existing literature to promote 
accessibility of breast cancer predictors: a single regulatory pathway for all 
genetic tests that requires clinical validity for FDA approval regardless of the 
method of test administration. This clinical testing requirement is balanced by 
the utilization of technology such as CRISPR to supplement patient clinical data 
with accurate laboratory data, incentivizing companies to enter the genetic 
testing market so that breast cancer predictors are accessible to the women who 
need them. 
II.  PROPRIETARY RIGHTS AND REGULATION OF BREAST CANCER PREDICTORS 
A. Relevance of Breast Cancer Predictors 
DNA is a genetic sequence that is formed by pairs of nucleotide bases, the 
order of which determines the structure and hereditary material of a living 
organism.22 The complete DNA sequence is known as the genome and contains 
approximately 20,000 to 25,000 genes, located on chromosomes in the nucleus 
of each human cell.23 The purpose of genetic testing is to identify variations in 
human genes that are linked to a genetic disease, in order to determine whether 
an individual is at an increased risk of disease development.24 Specific to breast 
 
 22. What is DNA? U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED. (June 23, 2020). 
 23. A Brief Guide to Genomics, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST., (last updated Nov. 7, 
2019). 
 24. Huang, supra note 7, at 555. 
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cancer, women who undergo genetic testing are interested in determining 
whether they have a breast cancer predictor, a BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene variation 
that is associated with breast cancer development.25 The BRCA genes impede 
tumor growth in breast cells and women want to know if they are at risk of a 
breast cancer predictor suppressing these genes.26 The BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes were discovered in 1990 and 1995 respectively, and the significance of 
this discovery was the identification of risk predictors for a disease that scientists 
understood to be hereditary without knowing the genes that indicated a risk.27 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., discovered the precise location of the BRCA2 gene, 
which allowed Myriad to not only determine the nucleotide sequence but to also 
use this sequence information in order to develop medical tests for the detection 
of breast cancer predictors.28  
Although this information can be extremely helpful to patients in making 
treatment decisions, genetic testing provides only an estimate of the probability 
of genetic disease development because gene expression is a factor of 
inheritance and of an individual’s environment.29 This is further complicated by 
the fact that there are identified gene variations for which the genetic disease 
risk is not known, making these “variants of unknown significance,” or VUS.30 
As technology has advanced, allowing for large portions of DNA to be 
sequenced quickly, the scientific understanding of the significance of gene 
variations has been outpaced by technological discovery.31 The BRCA1 gene is 
an illuminating example, as there are still thousands of VUS despite the 
pervasiveness of research.32 The consequence of this uncertainty is that women 
are making the private decision to undergo genetic testing for breast cancer 
predictors, understanding that the test results could be emotionally challenging, 
without the confidence that the results will be meaningful.33 Based on test 
results, a woman might choose to have a double mastectomy, or even to not have 
children to avoid the risk of passing on the gene, decisions that would be made 
based on uncertain test results.34 
The emergence of a new technology, called CRISPR, introduced the 
capability to not only identify thousands of BRCA gene variations but to also 
 
 25. Id. at 567. 
 26. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 583 (2013). 
 27. Jacob S. Sherkow & Henry T. Greely, The History of Patenting Genetic Material, 49 ANN. 
REV. GENETICS 161, 172 (2015); Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. at 583. 
 28. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. at 583. 
 29. See Huang, supra note 7, at 564–65. 
 30. Zhang, supra note 3. 
 31. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 18, at 685. 
 32. Zhang, supra note 3. 
 33. Huang, supra note 7, at 567–68. 
 34. Id. 
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accurately classify these variations as breast cancer predictors.35 CRISPR is a 
gene-editing technology that enables scientists to edit the DNA of human cells, 
using the Cas9 enzyme as “molecular scissors” to cut and modify DNA.36 Before 
CRISPR, scientists had spent decades attempting to catalog the many variations 
of the BRCA gene in order to classify the variations as breast cancer predictors.37 
As the BRCA1 gene sequence is 5,600 nucleotide bases in length, the process of 
looking at only one variation at a time would have taken decades.38 The CRISPR 
technology radically changed this approach, allowing scientists to genetically 
engineer 3,893 BRCA1 variations in a single study, based on only twenty-five 
percent of the BRCA1 coding sequence.39 This is already a significant increase 
from the 1,800 BRCA1 variations that had been identified as of 2016, and this 
doesn’t include the potential thousands of additional variations that could result 
from the analysis of the remaining seventy-five percent of the BRCA1 coding 
sequence.40  
Even more importantly, CRISPR is yielding accurate disease development 
risk prediction results.41 An early comparison of the risk prediction accuracy of 
variations identified by CRISPR with those BRCA1 variants for which patient 
data was already available is yielding an almost exact match.42 This means that 
CRISPR not only has the capability to identify BRCA gene variations but to also 
turn these identified variations into accurate breast cancer predictors. With the 
potential to significantly decrease the number of women who receive genetic 
testing results of unknown significance, which is as many as 5 out of 100 tested 
women today, it is crucial to make the CRISPR technology accessible to the 
women who need more comprehensive and accurate breast cancer genetic 
testing.43 In order for women to have this access, companies will need to 
navigate different layers of legal and regulatory frameworks. 
B. Emergence of Proprietary Rights over Breast Cancer Predictors 
In order to incentivize inventors to engage in costly and time-consuming 
research and development, as well as to produce socially valuable information, 
the patent system provides exclusivity of an invention to allow inventors to 
 
 35. Zhang, supra note 3. 
 36. STEPHAN RIXEN, BETWEEN MORAL HAZARD AND LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 18 (Matthias 
Braun et al. eds., 2018). 
 37. Zhang, supra note 3. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Valoir, supra note 1, at 76. 
 41. Shendure et al., supra note 2. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Zhang, supra note 3. 
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recover the innovation cost.44 Patent protection originated with the U.S. 
Constitution, which grants Congress the power “to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors 
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”45 An invention 
must meet three requirements in order to be eligible for patent protection.46 First, 
an invention must be useful, meaning it is classified as a “process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter.”47 Second, an invention must be novel, 
indicating it is the first of its kind to be patented.48 Third, an invention must be 
nonobvious, signifying it is sufficiently different from any prior inventions to 
not be obvious to a “person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed 
invention pertains.”49  
The application of these requirements to biological material occurred in 
1980, when the case Diamond v. Chakrabarty came before the Supreme Court 
for resolution of whether a human-made micro-organism was eligible for patent 
protection.50 Chakrabarty’s patent application for a human-made bacterium was 
rejected by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) on the grounds that 
the created micro-organism was a “product of nature.”51 This rejection was 
based on precedent that “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas” are not patentable subject matter, because a micro-organism, like the 
discovery of a new mineral or Newton’s discovery of the law of gravity, is a 
discovery of a manifestation of nature that is “free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.”52 The USPTO reasoned that because a micro-organism 
exists in nature, purification alone does not make it a “process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter” as required to meet the usefulness 
requirement.53 Chakrabarty appealed to the Patent Office Board of Appeals but 
the Board affirmed the rejection, maintaining that the usefulness requirement 
does not incorporate living things.54  
 
 44. In addition to recouping research and development costs, the exclusivity granted by patent 
protection also accounts for the cost of previous failed invention iterations. Roland E. Dukes et al., 
Accounting for Research and Development Costs: The Impact on Research and Development 
Expenditures, 18 J. ACCT. RES.1, 1–2 (1980). See Sherkow & Greely, supra note 28, at 162. See 
also Anna B. Laakmann, A Property Theory of Medical Innovation, 56 JURIMETRICS J. 117, 117–
18 (2016). 
 45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 46. Sherkow & Greely, supra note 28, at 163. 
 47. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 48. See id. § 102. 
 49. Id. § 103. 
 50. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). 
 51. Id. at 306. 
 52. Id. at 309 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
 53. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306; 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 54. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306. 
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In reviewing the Board’s decision, the Supreme Court focused on whether 
Chakrabarty’s micro-organism was covered by a “manufacture” or 
“composition of matter” classification.55 The Court interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 
to include “anything under the sun that is made by man,” holding that the micro-
organism was patent eligible because it had been created by Chakrabarty to have 
“markedly different characteristics from any found in nature.”56 As 
Chakrabarty’s invention was “not nature’s handiwork, but his own,” it was 
patentable subject matter because it was not a “product of nature.”57 Based on 
this case, the USPTO decided that isolated and purified DNA was eligible for 
patent protection because the separation of DNA from the cell environment, like 
the creation of a micro-organism in a laboratory, created a product that was 
sufficiently different from the natural product to no longer be a manifestation of 
nature.58 This USPTO decision led to the issuance of thousands of patents for 
genetic material that had been isolated from the cell environment, including 
patents for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.59 
Myriad Genetics, the discoverer of the BRCA2 gene, was granted patent 
protection for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in 1998.60 The patents included 
composition claims, detailing the DNA nucleotide sequences that cause a cell to 
produce specific BRCA1 and BRCA2 variations, and method claims, detailing 
the isolation of the DNA sequences contained in the composition claims.61 
Collectively, these patent claims distinguished Myriad as the sole holder of the 
right to isolate the DNA sequences contained in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes.62 This allowed Myriad to enforce its BRCA gene patents against any 
other company that was conducting breast cancer genetic testing because genetic 
testing requires the isolation of DNA sequences.63 In light of these patent 
challenges, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a suit in 2009 against 
Myriad in federal district court, alleging that Myriad’s patents were invalid as 
patents for “products of nature” under 35 U.S.C. § 101.64 By filing this suit, the 
petitioners hoped to invalidate Myriad’s patents, which would in turn allow other 
 
 55. Id. at 307. 
 56. Id. at 309–10. 
 57. Id. at 310. 
 58. Valoir, supra note 1, at 81. 
 59. Id. at 81–82. 
 60. Sherkow & Greely, supra note 28, at 172. 
 61. A patent composition claim covers a mixture of two or more substances, the combination 
of which creates composition properties not held by the substances when separate. WILLIAM C. 
ROBINSON, LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 278 (1890). A patent method claim, also 
known as a process claim, covers the steps required to bring about a specific result. Id. at 230. See 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 584 (2013). See also Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1239, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 62. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. at 585. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 369–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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companies to isolate BRCA1 and BRCA2 DNA sequences in the process of 
conducting breast cancer genetic testing.65 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the petitioners for 
the composition claims, holding that the claims were invalid as “products of 
nature.”66 However, the Federal Circuit reversed based on the above-mentioned 
holding in Chakrabarty, reasoning that isolated DNA is not a product of nature 
because it consists of “molecules that are markedly different – have a distinctive 
chemical identity and nature – from molecules that exist in nature.”67 After 
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the 
case to the Federal Circuit for a decision consistent with the newly decided Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.68  
The Court in Mayo recognized that while a law of nature is not patentable, 
an application of it could be eligible for patent protection if the application 
transforms “unpatentable natural laws into patent-eligible applications of those 
laws.”69 This means that if a law of nature, as applied, is sufficiently different 
from the product as found in nature, it can be eligible for patent protection. The 
Court held that the patent method claims at issue did not meet this standard 
because the process steps involved “well-understood, routine, conventional 
activity.”70 
On remand, the analysis of the BRCA patents was expanded to look at not 
only whether the composition claims covered products of nature, but also 
whether the composition claims were transformed by the method claims into 
patent-eligible subject matter.71 The Federal Circuit held that the isolated 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 DNA sequence claims were eligible for patent protection 
because “the act of isolating DNA … is an inventive act that entitles the 
individual who first isolates it to a patent.”72 When the case again reached the 
Supreme Court, the Court reversed and unanimously held that “a naturally 
occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and [is] not patent eligible merely 
because it has been isolated.”73 
The Supreme Court’s holding that genes and genetic tests are not eligible 
for patent protection has significant consequences for companies in the genetic 
testing market.74 Without the ability to exclude others from a potential genetic 
testing invention via patent protection, it can be assumed under contemporary 
 
 65. Id. at 369. 
 66. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 67. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1239, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 68. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 566 U.S. 902 (2012). 
 69. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc. 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012). 
 70. Id. at 73. 
 71. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 72. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 586–87 (2013). 
 73. Id. at 580. 
 74. See id. at 585. 
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intellectual property regimes that companies will lack the incentive to produce 
innovative genetics tests that are valuable to society.75 However, patent 
protection does not work alone in the field of innovation. While patent protection 
encourages inventiveness, public health regulation encourages the production of 
inventive data during the progression from idea to market.76 The problem is that 
the lack of regulatory uniformity is impeding companies from entering the 
genetic testing market, resulting in a lack of access to innovation for patients.77 
C. Inconsistent Regulation of Breast Cancer Predictors 
In order for these products to be made available to patients, the product must 
be approved by the FDA.78 The FDA is a regulatory agency that is part of the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and is tasked with assuring the 
safety and effectiveness of drugs, biological products, and medical devices.79 
Congress authorized the FDA to regulate medical devices, products that are 
“intended for use in the diagnosis … or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or 
prevention of disease,” with the passage of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act in 1938.80 This empowered the FDA to monitor medical devices 
that are on the market in order to identify potential risks to patient safety and 
track adverse patient events.81 The passage of the Medical Device Amendments 
in 1976 expanded FDA oversight of medical devices, authorizing the FDA to 
enforce safety and effectiveness standards that medical devices must meet before 
being placed on the market.82  
Since genetic tests are used in the diagnosis and prevention of disease, the 
FDA regulates these tests as medical devices.83 Depending on how a genetic test 
is produced and marketed, it can be regulated as either an in vitro diagnostic 
device (IVD) or a laboratory developed test (LDT).84 IVDs are “reagents, 
instruments, and systems intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other 
conditions, including a determination of the state of health, in order to cure, 
mitigate, treat, or prevent disease” and as such, are “intended for use in the 
 
 75. See Laakmann, supra note 45, at 118. 
 76. Id. at 119. 
 77. See Kirk Willmarth, The FDA and Genetic Testing: Improper Tools for a Difficult 
Problem, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 158, 164 (2015). 
 78. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 16. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 201(h), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h); John E. Meyer, The 
Future of the FDA’s Application of Enforcement Discretion on Laboratory Developed Tests, 12 J. 
HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 43, 47 (2019). 
 81. See Regulatory Controls, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-
devices/overview-device-regulation/regulatory-controls (last updated Mar. 27, 2018). 
 82. Meyer, supra note 81. 
 83. Zettler et al., supra note 17. 
 84. Andrew S. Robertson, The Role of DNA Patents in Genetic Test Innovation and Access, 9 
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 377, 393 (2011). 
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collection, preparation, and examination of specimens taken from the human 
body.”85 A genetic test is classified as an IVD when it is manufactured by a 
company and then purchased by a laboratory to be used for testing.86 LDTs are 
a category of IVDs and a genetic test is classified as an LDT when it is 
manufactured and used by the same laboratory.87 
For a consumer, the main difference between IVDs and LDTs is how each 
is regulated by the FDA, as there is a significant difference in the standards that 
must be met before being placed on the market.88 The FDA plays a direct role 
in the regulation of IVDs, requiring proof of both analytic and clinical validity.89 
As related to genetic testing, analytic validity is proof that a test correctly 
identifies gene variations and clinical validity is proof that a test accurately 
reports the predictions of disease development risk that correlate to those 
variations.90 The level of review of IVDs, as medical devices, is contingent on 
the device classification assigned by the FDA.91 Medical devices can be 
classified as Class I, Class II, or Class III, based on the risk the device could 
pose to the consumer.92 Increased risk to the consumer requires additional 
oversight by the FDA in order to assure the public’s safety, with Class III being 
the highest risk class.93 Genetic tests have been classified as either Class II or 
Class III, both of which can require costly clinical testing and submission of 
clinical data for evaluation prior to FDA approval and subsequent market 
placement.94 
LDTs, on the other hand, have historically been regulated by the FDA only 
at its discretion because LDTs are also regulated by the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS) via the Clinical Laboratories Improvements 
Amendments Act (CLIA).95 Congress passed CLIA in 1988, authorizing CMS 
to regulate laboratory tests that are conducted on human subjects for non-
research purposes.96 Under CLIA, CMS requires proof of only analytic validity, 
focusing on the reliability of the laboratory performing the LDT, as compared 
to the requirement of analytic and clinical validity for IVDs.97 This means that 
a genetic test classified as an LDT only requires proof that the test correctly 
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identifies gene variations, with no requirement of proof that the test accurately 
reports the predictions of disease development risk that correlate to those 
variations.98  
The stark differences between regulating a genetic test as an IVD or an LDT 
illustrate how patient access to genetic testing is hindered by the variability in 
regulation, as this makes it difficult for companies to determine the validity data 
required for FDA approval. This decision might then impact the choice of 
whether to enter the genetic testing market.99 The resulting negative impact on 
women’s access to breast cancer predictors is in addition to the access barrier 
created by the lack of proprietary rights for genes and genetic tests.100 This 
Article will first analyze these two legal considerations separately, illustrating 
that the lack of impact of the Myriad holding on the trade secrecy of its breast 
cancer predictor data, as considered with the inconsistent regulation by the FDA 
following the introduction of direct-to-consumer genetic tests, presents an 
urgent issue that is difficult to ignore. This Article will then propose a solution 
that promotes accessibility of breast cancer predictors, a single regulatory 
pathway for all genetic tests that requires both proof and transparency of clinical 
validity data. 
III.  IMPEDIMENTS TO WOMEN BENEFITTING FROM BREAST CANCER 
PREDICTORS 
A. Problematic Trade Secrecy of Breast Cancer Predictors 
As discussed, the case law history of Myriad’s BRCA gene patents 
established that genes and genetic tests are not eligible for patent protection.101 
Due to the invalidation of its patents, Myriad no longer can exclude other 
companies from entering the breast cancer genetic testing market.102 However, 
these other potential companies are at an extreme disadvantage. Although the 
holding in Myriad addressed the patentability of genes and genetic tests, it did 
not impact the trade secrecy of BRCA gene variations known exclusively to 
Myriad.103 As the holder of the only BRCA gene patents, Myriad was the 
primary provider of BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic tests for sixteen years, 
allowing Myriad to accumulate patient data on identified BRCA gene 
variations.104 The consequence of this data monopolization was that Myriad was 
the only company that had sufficient data on identified BRCA gene variations 
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to turn these variations into accurate breast cancer predictors.105 This placed 
Myriad in a position to offer superior breast cancer genetic testing as compared 
to its competitors because the collection of patient data for sixteen years allowed 
Myriad to offer a more comprehensive breast cancer development risk 
analysis.106  
While patents and trade secrecy share the same goal of encouraging 
invention, the incentives offered by these two systems remain separate.107 In 
contrast to the federal patent system, trade secrecy operates at the state level.108 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been implemented in forty-seven U.S. states 
and protects information as a trade secret if it is valuable for competition, subject 
to reasonable efforts of confidentiality, and not generally known by others in the 
trade.109 The Supreme Court held in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Co. that 
inventions that are eligible for patent protection can also be classified as trade 
secrets, stating that “the patent policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed 
by the existence of another form of incentive to invention.”110 Based on the 
Court’s conclusion that the patent and trade secrecy regimes are not in conflict, 
Myriad’s proprietary breast cancer predictor data can be protected as a trade 
secret even though its patents have been invalidated.111 
Myriad’s monopolization of breast cancer predictor data is significant when 
considered as a vital source of data to help classify the nearly 4,000 BRCA1 
gene variations discovered thus far by CRISPR.112 While an initial analysis of 
the breast cancer development risk of these variations has been completed, 
yielding accurate results, the medical community remains hesitant to base 
patient treatment decisions on only laboratory data.113 While the CRISPR 
technology has the potential to bridge the gap between the interest of women in 
undergoing breast cancer genetic testing and the need for accurate breast cancer 
predictors, women cannot utilize the comprehensive genetic testing made 
possible by CRISPR without doctor endorsement.114 If the only alternative to 
laboratory data to classify breast cancer predictors is patient data, companies 
will be forced to conduct years of clinical testing in order to collect patient data 
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that is likely duplicative of the data already known to Myriad.115 This is in direct 
conflict with the reality that women simply do not have the luxury of waiting.  
B. Complication of Breast Cancer Predictor Regulation Due to Direct-to-
Consumer Tests 
Historically, women have undergone breast cancer genetic testing as 
administered by either a physician or a laboratory technician.116 As noted above, 
companies must grapple with the differing standards in genetic test regulation 
based on a classification of a genetic test as either an IVD or an LDT.117 
Companies are now faced with an additional potential classification for when a 
woman decides to conduct the genetic test herself, using a direct-to-consumer 
(DTC) test.118 The regulation of breast cancer predictors was already uncertain 
and the new classification of genetic tests by administration method instead of 
risk further complicates an already inconsistent regulatory environment.119 
Following the FDA approval of the first breast cancer predictor DTC test in 
2018 for the company 23andMe, women gained the option to use a DTC test for 
three specific BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene variations.120 This approval came four 
years after the FDA issued a draft guidance for the regulation of LDTs that far 
from clarified the regulatory standards applicable to DTC tests.121 The FDA 
decided that, even if a DTC test met the definition of an LDT, enforcement 
discretion would not be exercised and the FDA would regulate all DTC tests as 
IVDs.122 The practical implication of this decision is that companies that create 
and market DTC tests will be required to prove both analytic and clinical validity 
in order to obtain FDA approval, as opposed to only analytic validity as required 
for LDTs.123 While classifying DTC tests as IVDs means that the FDA has 
recognized the increased risk of DTC tests due to patients making their own 
treatment decisions, the requirement of clinical validity for DTC tests 
emphasizes the contrast between IVDs and LDTs.124  
Notwithstanding the advent of DTC tests, there are still 11,000 laboratories 
in the United States that are authorized to perform LDTs.125 It is well recognized 
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that without requiring clinical validity prior to FDA approval, a genetic test 
classified as an LDT is at risk of producing inaccurate or misleading results.126 
Even the FDA has acknowledged that the public needs increased oversight of 
LDTs in order to ensure genetic tests are accurate and reliable.127 Yet, the FDA 
has only issued two draft guidance documents regarding the discretionary 
regulation of LDTs, both in 2014, prior to the 2017 publication of a discussion 
paper stating that a final guidance would not be issued.128 While this discussion 
paper mentions a focus on clinical validity, showing that the FDA is aware of 
the regulatory standards gap between IVDs, including DTC tests, and LDTs, the 
discussion paper is merely a suggestion as opposed to binding FDA 
regulation.129  
Women need to be confident that the choice to undergo breast cancer genetic 
testing will yield results that accurately reflect not only the identified BRCA 
gene variations but also any present breast cancer predictors. It is hard to see 
how women can have this confidence when making the choice between testing 
performed by a doctor, a laboratory technician, or at home can change the 
validity of the results. Thus, a defined regulatory pathway for breast cancer 
genetic testing is needed for both the women who are at risk of developing the 
disease and the health care providers responsible for advising these women of 
their treatment options. This becomes even more crucial in light of the 
exponential increase in the number of BRCA gene variations discovered thus far 
by CRISPR.130 This regulatory pathway needs to balance the need for clinical 
validity for each variant with the understanding of how making this approval 
requirement too onerous might make genetic testing an impracticable pursuit 
due to the required time and company resources.131 The proposal that follows 
combines this need for a single regulatory pathway with the reality of the 
unavailability of breast cancer predictor patient data due to trade secrecy, 
balancing a requirement for clinical validity for all genetic tests with the use of 
technology such as CRISPR to supplement patient clinical data. 
IV.  A PROPOSAL TO REGULATE GENETIC TESTING TO PROMOTE 
ACCESSIBILITY OF BREAST CANCER PREDICTORS 
In order for women to gain access to breast cancer predictors, companies 
need to have incentives to enter the genetic testing market. The following 
analysis details a proposed solution to grant women this needed access. This 
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proposal is for a single regulatory pathway for all genetic tests that balances the 
requirement of clinical validity with the supplementation of patient data, by 
technology such as CRISPR, in order to overcome the inaccessibility of breast 
cancer predictors due to proprietary rights protection. 
The first component of the proposed regulatory pathway is a requirement for 
clinical validity for both LDTs and IVDs, including DTC tests. The FDA could 
pursue this requirement in two ways – it could regulate all genetic testing as 
IVDs, thereby requiring clinical validity prior to FDA approval, or it could 
require proof of clinical validity for LDTs.132 Both of these options would result 
in a uniform approach for all genetic tests that requires both analytic and clinical 
validity prior to FDA approval. This would allow women to feel confident in 
their breast cancer genetic testing results, as all genetic tests would be required 
to prove not only the correct identification of BRCA gene variations but also the 
accurate predictions of disease development risk correlated with those 
variations.133 Without the standardized requirement of clinical validity, genetic 
tests are at risk of producing inaccurate and misleading results due to the lack of 
FDA oversight.134 There is simply too much at stake to allow for even the 
possibility of inaccurate results considering the private and personal treatment 
decisions women are making based on the test results.135  
While these two options are both viable, the FDA has implied that it is open 
to requiring clinical validity for LDTs.136 This is because this route would 
provide an impartial confirmation of the quality of genetic test results, providing 
assurance the test works as intended.137 Although it could be argued that 
uniformity of validity data in this instance is minimizing the uniqueness of 
LDTs, a product that might be better off with product-specific regulation, the 
FDA itself has acknowledged that heightened oversight of LDTs is needed in 
order to ensure test accuracy.138 In addition, while some LDT advocates have 
expressed concerns that requiring clinical validity for LDTs would duplicate 
CLIA regulation efforts by CMS, the FDA has stated that this requirement would 
be complementary to, and not duplicative of, CMS regulation requirements.139 
This suggests that the FDA is willing to keep both the LDT and IVD 
classifications for genetic tests and that this route will best meet the breast cancer 
predictor accessibility needs of women. 
If clinical validity is required for all genetic tests, companies will need to 
know what data can be used to meet this requirement in order to bring genetic 
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tests to the patients who need them. While the FDA has historically required 
patient data, it stated in 2017 that it was willing to consider clinical validity that 
is “supported by literature, well-curated databases, or other appropriate sources 
that meet the valid scientific evidence standard.”140 As applied to breast cancer 
genetic testing, this could mean that studies performed with CRISPR might be 
an option to classify identified BRCA gene variations as breast cancer 
predictors, as opposed to needing actual patient data for this classification. The 
use of scientific data to supplement patient data also offsets the significant 
clinical testing costs that can be incurred by companies, helping to incentivize 
companies to pursue the genetic testing market.141 This is even more salient due 
to Myriad’s monopolization of breast cancer predictor patient data.142 The 
availability of scientific data has the potential to decrease the time and cost of 
clinical validity data collection significantly, as illustrated by the single study 
that identified nearly 4,000 BRCA1 gene variations and accurately classified 
these variations as breast cancer predictors.143  
Although this Article focuses on breast cancer genetic testing, the analysis 
can extend to not only other hereditary diseases but also to other technology. 
The “nearly perfectly accurate” results of the BRCA1 variation CRISPR study 
as related to breast cancer predictors is a promising start, for both the 
classification of future BRCA gene variations and the wide array of other 
hereditary diseases.144 Even though the number of people who have received 
uncertain genetic testing results has been downplayed by some, with claims that 
uncertain results only occur in a minority of genetic tests, it cannot be denied 
that even one variation of unknown significance is too many when human lives 
are at stake.145 In addition, the technological advance demonstrated by CRISPR 
has essentially guaranteed that the number of identified gene variations will only 
continue to grow, illustrating that the identification of variations of unknown 
significance is just beginning. While doctors may prefer patient data as opposed 
to laboratory data for classifying gene variations as disease predictors, the 
confidence of the scientists who conducted the CRISPR study and the 
willingness of the FDA to consider scientific sources for clinical data illustrates 
a potential shift that could lead to doctor endorsement of this alternative source 
of clinical validity.146 
The second component of the proposed regulatory pathway is a requirement 
for disclosure of breast cancer predictors as part of the FDA approval process. 
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Transforming BRCA gene variations into breast cancer predictors requires as 
much data as can be compiled due to the seriousness of the decisions women are 
making in light of their test results.147 Genetic tests should only be made 
available when both the companies and the FDA are confident that the tests 
provide a scientifically supported disease development risk prediction, and this 
requires the collation of breast cancer predictor data in order to ensure both data 
accessibility and accuracy.148 By requiring the disclosure of breast cancer 
predictors as part of genetic test approval, the FDA could incentivize companies 
to enter the market by lowering the clinical testing barrier to entry based on the 
data already available for review and analysis.  
If companies could access breast cancer predictors shared by others in the 
industry, women could more readily gain access to the entire range of breast 
cancer predictors, keeping pace with the advancement of technology. Although 
the FDA has been criticized because of industry financial conflicts of interest, it 
is the federal regulatory agency that currently has the authority and 
responsibility to ensure the safety and effectiveness of genetic tests.149 As such, 
it is in the unique position to make breast cancer predictors accessible via market 
incentives. Market incentives can include motivations rooted in private profits 
via commercialization, societal improvement, or public safety.150 In addition, 
the requirement to share breast cancer predictors as part of FDA approval would 
remove the trade secrecy disadvantage caused by Myriad’s proprietary breast 
cancer predictor data. By requiring disclosure of breast cancer predictors, in 
addition to allowing for the use of laboratory data in the classification of these 
predictors, the FDA would be strengthening the incentive for companies to enter 
the genetic testing market through the provision of not one but two sources of 
clinical testing cost offset. If women are going to gain access to breast cancer 
predictors, they need companies to pursue this market. 
The required disclosure of breast cancer predictor data incentivizes 
accessibility more than public databases because the current public databases 
depend on the voluntary sharing of data in order to make correlations between 
gene variations and disease development risk.151 Voluntary sharing of data is 
just not enough for the women and health care providers who need access to 
breast cancer predictors in order to make informed treatment decisions, as this 
voluntary sharing has led to multiple databases with inconsistent and variable 
data from which it is difficult to extract reliable information.152 Similarly, health 
care payors are also not the solution for data disclosure, as there are hundreds of 
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existing contracts between genetic testing firms and health care payors that do 
not require this disclosure.153 If the need for accessible breast cancer predictors 
cannot depend on voluntarily shared research or health care payor contracts, this 
places the FDA at a crucial junction to meet this need. Additionally, the FDA 
would not need to start from scratch for a breast cancer predictor database 
because it could utilize an existing partnership with the National Institutes of 
Health in order to develop the needed database infrastructure.154 
This proposed solution of a single regulatory pathway for all genetic tests is 
the first step in the delivery of innovative health care to patients afflicted with 
hereditary diseases. While this Article does not address the affordability of this 
innovation, relevant to both patients and society at large, innovation starts with 
incentive. Incentive is not limited to private profits but also includes a 
motivation to improve society and further public safety.155 In order for breast 
cancer predictors to be accessible to the women who need them, companies need 
the incentive to enter the genetic testing market and this Article examines how 
proprietary rights and regulation can impact this incentive and, ultimately, 
patient access. Accessibility of breast cancer predictors requires a solution to 
overcome these impediments to innovation and the solution in this Article is a 
good place to start. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There are millions of women at risk of developing breast cancer in the 
United States and over one million women have already undergone genetic 
testing of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in order to determine whether they are 
at risk of disease development due to variations in these genes.156 There is 
clearly patient interest in breast cancer genetic testing, but accurate genetic 
testing requires companies to produce and market genetic tests that utilize the 
entire range of breast cancer predictors. While the CRISPR technology has been 
used to not only identify thousands of BRCA1 gene variations but also 
accurately classify these variations as breast cancer predictors, proprietary rights 
and regulation are stopping companies from utilizing this technological advance 
to provide women the accurate genetic tests they need.157 Therefore, a single 
regulatory pathway is needed for all genetic tests that balances the requirement 
of clinical validity with the supplementation of patient data, by technology such  
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as CRISPR, in order to overcome the inaccessibility of breast cancer predictors 
due to proprietary rights protection. 
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